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To the Victor Go No Spoils? The United
States as an Invading Military Force and Its
Relationship With Economic Contracts in
Occupied Iraq
Michael Davey*
I.

Introduction

Shortly before dawn in Iraq on the morning of March 20, 2003,
explosions from United States' missiles rocked what would have been an
otherwise tranquil Baghdad morning.' After more than six months of
deadlocked debate in the United Nations over the consequences to Iraq
for failing to comply with orders to disarm,2 President George W. Bush
ordered the U.S. invasion of Iraq to commence. 3 Citing the need to
protect the security of both the United States and the world, the end of
Saddam Hussein's regime began with a few dozen Tomahawk missiles
and precision bombs.4
Twenty-two days later, the Hussein government collapsed, amid
U.S. troops driving down the streets of Baghdad.' By April 20, 2003, the
United States had begun the process of rebuilding post-war Iraq; a
reconstruction project on a scale unparalleled since the end of the Second
World War.6 As of April 2005, the United States military remains in Iraq
* J.D. candidate 2005, Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of
Law.
1. US. Begins War in Iraq, PresidentBush Addresses Nation, First Strikes Target
Iraqi Capital, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2003, at C13.
2. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981s Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
3. Joseph Curl and Bill Sammon, The "Decapitation" Begins; President Bush
Opens A "Broad Campaign" Vowing to Accept "No Outcome But Victory, " WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at AOL.
4. Id.
5. Anthony Shadid, Hussein's Baghdad Falls; U.S. Forces Move Triumphantly
Through Capital Streets, Cheered By Crowds Jubilant at End of Oppressive Regime,
WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at AO1.
6. Peter Slevin and Monte Reel, US.Pledges to Persevere InRebuilding; General
inCharge of Effort Vows Iraqis Will Elect Their Own Leaders, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
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as occupiers and rebuilders, and does not seem likely to leave anytime
soon, considering the violence that is still prevalent. 7 Even though the
technical military campaign has been ended, the proper role for the
military is to remain in order to restore the government of Iraq as a
functioning entity, and secure the gains made by a military occupation.8
As in all rebuilding efforts, there must be some consideration paid
to economic infrastructure, such as natural resources and transportation.
These types of considerations lead to the inevitable question of what the
United States' proper role in these economic investments should be.
After all, this is not the traditional situation of the United States offering
an economic loan to an impoverished country, or a private McDonald's
franchise being opened in Moscow's Red Square. Rather, there presently
exists the unique situation of the United States' presence in Iraq as an
occupying (and hence governing) military force until a new Iraqi state
government can be officially established. Thus, the question then
becomes what differences, if any, may arise when a conquering and
occupying military force engages in economic contracting?
First, this comment will take a historical look at past regime
changes and their effect upon pre-existing international contracts. Then,
this comment will consider any economic contracts made with the former
Hussein regime, and analyze their legal significance now that one of the
parties to those contracts no longer exist. Can the United States, as a
military occupying force, step in and assume the old Iraqi regime's
position in such contracts?
Secondly, this comment will examine the relationship between the
United States and new economic contracts that have yet to be made. If
the United States, in the place of the former Hussein government, enters
into such contracts, does the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Government Procurement or the United Nations Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States prevent the United States from making
unilateral decisions about which countries may or may not be allowed to
bid upon them?
II.

Historical Regime Changes and Their Impact on Pre-Existing
Contracts

Under the traditional common law, there must be at least two parties
engaged in an exchange of promises in order for a contract to be in legal

2003 at A19.
7. See Ann Scott Tyson, Battle-Weary Marine Unit Awaits 'Taste of Freedom',
WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2005, at AO1.
8. See United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
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existence. 9 The obvious corollary to this rule is that a contract becomes
dissolved upon the death or incapacity of one of the entities necessary to
its completion,1° or when a necessary event for the completion of the
contract is rendered impracticable or impossible.11 This usually blackand-white landscape can become muddied when one or more of the
parties to a contract are sovereign nations. Do the same general rules of
contract apply if one of the contracting parties that is a "government"
becomes dissolved or deposed before the contract is completed?
Indeed, one can look to at least three other periods in history to see
how these problems were resolved under international law. Illuminating
are the effects that the 1917 Soviet coup in Russia,12 the Cuban
Revolution that culminated in 1958,13 and the break-up of Yugoslavia in
the early 1990's had on the legal status of pre-existing contracts.
In 1918, the Russian Imperial Tsar abdicated the throne, was held in
house arrest in Siberia, and eventually murdered by Bolshevik
revolutionary supporters.' 4 A civil war soon followed, with a provisional
government assuming control of the country, followed by the victorious
Bolsheviks seizing the reins of power and forming the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.' 5 This political upheaval naturally resulted in legal
consequences for any contracts which the former Imperial government
was party to.
One such example is found in the case of Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., v.
State of Russia, which involved an action by the State of Russia against
an American Railroad company for a breach of contract.16 One of the
defenses mounted by the railroad company was that the contract was
originally entered into between the defendant and the Imperial
9.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 9 (1981).

10.
11.

Id. at § 262.
Id. at § 263.

12.

JOHN M. THOMPSON, RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 188-198 (Westview Press

1998).
13.

Microsoft®

Encarta®

Online

Encyclopedia

2003,

Cuba,

2003

at

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761569844_7/Cuba.html [hearinafter Microsoftf].
14. THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 189.
15. Id.

16. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927). The
Imperial Russian government had entrusted the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company with
the transport of a freight shipment of ammunition and explosives. On July 30, 1916, a
fire broke out at the freight yards where the Imperial ammunition was being kept by the
Railroad company. The explosives and ammunition exploded, and a complete loss
resulted the Imperial Russian government commenced this suit alleging a breach of
contract of the Railroad as a common carrier. In the midst of this suit, the Imperial
Russian government was overthrown, and the Railroad company alleged that this suit
could not be rightfully continued because the rights attached to the destroyed property
(and thus to the contractual relief) belonged to the Imperial Russian government,
which no longer existed. Id.
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government of Russia, and as a result, the current Soviet Government of17
Russia did not have legal standing to bring a breach of contract claim.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that notwithstanding the current political situation in
Russia, the international state of Russia still remained, and could
government.'8
continue any actions properly begun before the change in
The Court also noted "abatement of the action or a dismissal could only
be sustained by reason of the nonexistence of the state."' 9 Having found
the sovereign Russian state to still be in existence, the Second Circuit
allowed the breach of contract claim.2 °
In 1959, revolutionaries, led by Fidel Castro, successfully overthrew
the government of dictator Fulgencio Batista, replacing it with a new
During Castro's seizure of power, the new
socialist regime. 2 1
revolutionary government began to expropriate many United States
interests, both real and liquidated properties, located on the island of
Cuba.22 Most of these actions resulting in lawsuits being filed by either
American interests or by the Cuban government regarding the
23
international legal status of such maneuvers.
In one of these suits, the Castro's revolutionary government
expropriated an American corporation that ran an electric utility in Cuba
before the Revolution.24 One of the primary issues before the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was whether or not the Castro government had
assumed all of the debt obligations of the corporation seized, thus
resulting in Cuban indebtedness to American banks. 2' The Court
escaped resolution of this issue by ruling instead that Cuba was liable for
the debts of the expropriated electric corporation because it had
discriminated against the interests of both the United States and its
nationals in violation of international law. 26 However, the Court did
premise its ruling on the assumption that upon expropriation, the
Revolutionary government of Cuba had assumed the obligations of both

17. Id. at 399.
18. Id. at 400.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. MicrosoftS, supra, note 13.
22. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 878. (2d Cir.
1981).
23. Id. See also First National City Bank v. Banco Para Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611 (1983) and First National Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658
F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981).
24. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1987).
25. Id. at 236.
26. Id.
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foreign and international creditors.27 Therefore, the Court had indirectly
found the new Revolutionary government liable for the debts incurred by
a corporation under the old government.28
Finally, in 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter SFRY) was splintered as a result of ineffective leadership,
civil wars, and long-time ethnic hostilities between Serb, Croat, and
Bosnian Muslim factions.2 9 When the smoke finally cleared in 1992,
five separate states had emerged-Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia,
Bosnia/Herzegovina and the Federa! Republic of Yugoslavia.3 °
With their emergence also came concerns over property rights,
financial assets, and the status of pre-existing contracts held by the
former SFRY.3' In June of 2001, representatives from each of the five
states came together in Vienna to conclude a treaty that would finally
spell out the answers to these difficult questions.32 The most significant
portion of that treaty for purposes of this article is "Annex G," which
declares that the five successor states are obligated to respect all
contracts, 33 patents, copyrights, and trademarks previously made by any
private or public actors of the former SFRY.34
In all three of these situations, we see a trend that seems to stand for
the proposition that within the realm of international law, a sovereign
nation is more than simply the formal government at its head. Rather, all
of the historical precedents recounted above reflect the rule that the
contractual rights and obligations held by a sovereign state will survive
27. Id. at 237.
28. Id.
at http://encarta.msn.com/
29. Microsoft®, Yugoslavia: History, 2004
encyclopedia_7615671451 7/ Yugoslavia.html.
30. Id. Note that in February of 2003, the breakaway State of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to "Serbia and Montenegro." This name still
stands today. Id.
31. Agreement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of the
Former Yugoslavia, June 29, 2001, 41 I.L.M 3, 3 [hereinafter Agreement].
32. Id.
33. Agreement, annex G, art. 2, para. 2, at 35. Annex G, article 2(2) reads as
follows:
(2) All contracts concluded by citizens or other legal persons of the SFRY as of
31 December 1990, including those concluded by public enterprises, shall be
respected on a non-discriminatory basis. The successor States shall provide for
the carrying out of obligations under such contracts, where the performance of
such contracts was prevented by the break-up of the SFRY.
Id.
34. Agreement, annex G, art. 3, at 35. Annex G, article 3 reads as follows:
The successor States shall respect and protect rights of all natural and juridical
persons of the SFRY to intellectual property, including patents, trade marks,
copyrights, and other allied rights (e.g., royalties) and shall comply with
international conventions in that regard.
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notwithstanding any political upheavals or governmental depositions that
may occur. What follows from this, therefore, is that any and all
contractual obligations and entitlements held by the former Hussein
regime must have legally survived the recent war.
III.

Contracts of the Former Hussein Regime and the "Act of State"
Doctrine

With Iraq and Saddam Hussein, however, a new problem is now
confronted. In all of the cases referred to above, there existed a contract
dispute regarding the proper standing or obligations of the new
government that rose to power through civil war, revolution, or both.
However, in the present situation with the United States and Iraq, there
was no internal force that seized the reins of power and ousted the
Hussein government. Rather, an invading American force overthrew
Saddam's government, and left no "official" Iraqi state government in its
place. The United States did, as a military occupying force, rightly
assume all administrative and governmental responsibilities.35 Does this
mean, following the trend in the cases discussed above, that all rights and
obligations of the former Hussein government have now attached
themselves to the United States as well?
It would seem, based on historical legal precedent discussed above,
that the answer to this question would be yes. That is, any and all
obligations of the former regime would probably attach to the United
States while in the role of military occupier, before political and
administrative control is officially handed over to a new Iraqi
government.3 6 If this is indeed true, then many private businesses and
corporations who may have been a party to a contract with the former
Iraqi regime, and who fear a breach of any contractual obligations
following the war, may be now presented with a unique opportunity to
settle any contractual problems with the United States, instead of waiting
until all contractual rights are once again passed to a new Iraqi
government in the future.
Why would it be in the best interests of these private parties to deal
with these contracts now, instead of waiting until yet another governing
entity takes over? The answer lies in the "Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act,"3 7 which has codified what was, under the common law, the "act of
state" doctrine.
The "act of state" doctrine has its common law roots in the 1897

35.
36.
37.

See United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
See cases cited supra notes 16, 22-24.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
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U.S. Supreme Court case of Underhill v. Herndandez, 8 where the Court
considered a claim brought by Underhill, alleging that he was falsely
imprisoned by one General Hernandez while a resident in Venezuela.39
The Court refused to hand down a decision on the merits of Underhill's
of
claim, stating that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
' 40
the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory."
In 1918, the Supreme Court heard two cases in which it favorably
cited Underhill, both involving the seizure of land by the Mexican
government during the Mexican Revolution.4 ' In both cases, the Court
held that it was still inappropriate to pass judgment upon the
governmental actions of a foreign power, under fear of straining relations
between the United States and Mexico.42 These decisions form the
They stand for the
underpinning of the "act of state" doctrine.
proposition that when a case or controversy involves the official act(s) of
a sovereign foreign government, committed within that government's
jurisdiction, the courts of the United States should not, and will not, sit in
judgment of those decisions.
The "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act" (hereinafter the FSIA),
passed by Congress in 1977, codifies this common law "act of state"
doctrine.4 3 With limited exceptions,44 the FSIA states that foreign states
are immune from the jurisdiction of both the U.S. federal and state
courts.45 Furthermore, the term "foreign state," as used in the FSIA,
refers to all political subdivisions, agents and instrumentalities of a
foreign state.4 6 This definition includes foreign corporations and all
other separate legal entities.47
38. Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
39. Id. at 251-2.
40. Id. at 252.
41. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) and Ricaud v. American
Metal Co,. Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
42. Oeten, 246 U.S. at 301 and Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Section 1604 reads:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
44. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607.

45.

See id. § 1604.

46. See id. § 1603(a). Section 1603(a) reads: "A 'foreign state,' except as used in
section 1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." Id.
47. See id. § 1603(b). Section 1603(b) reads:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or
a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
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There is currently, however, some ambiguity among U.S. courts as
to how, or if, the act of state doctrine, as codified under the FSIA, should
be applied to breach of contract cases involving a foreign state. From its
inception under the common law, the act of state doctrine has been
predicated upon two related foreign policy concerns. One, a court should
be wary about rendering judgment in a case involving a foreign
sovereign, for that judgment may result in a strain upon U.S. foreign
relations with that sovereign.4 8 Second, there is a concern that any
judgment rendered by a court in favor of, or against, a foreign sovereign
party may be in direct conflict with the U.S. foreign policies set by the
executive branch towards that particular foreign sovereign.49 Opponents
of the use of the act of state doctrine in contract cases argue that both
underlying policy concerns are traditionally absent from contract suits. 50
Commercial contract cases will rarely involve situations where the
court's resolutions will affect, or be in 5conflict
with any direct executive
1
pronouncements of U.S. foreign policy.
If one considers, then, the common law and public policy
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine, it becomes apparent that this
theory will not be of any concern to a party who, in fear of a loss or
repudiation of contractual obligations, brings suit against the United
States as successor-in-interest of the contractual duties of the former
Hussein regime. Most notably, the act of state doctrine would have no
apparent application to those actions, because U.S. courts would not be
placed in a position of rendering a decision that could have either a direct
or indirect effect upon U.S. foreign policy. Rather, courts would simply
be asked to adjudge the contractual obligations that exist upon the federal
government.
Thus, it is important for any legal actor who was a party to a
contract with Saddam's regime, and who fears repudiation of any
contractual terms now that the old government is no longer in power, to
resolve any and all issues while the United States remains as a military
occupying force. Technically, the United States handed over all
administrative and governmental duties to the Iraqis in the summer of

foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
Id.
48.

Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 1, 80-1 (1998) (discussing a "contracts exception" to the act of state doctrine).

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
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2004.52 At that point, following the precedents established by Underhill
v. Hernandez and its progenies, all of the contractual obligations of the
Hussein regime, having passed to the U.S. following the Iraqi
occupation, would then have seemingly passed again onto the shoulders
of the new Iraqi government. If attempts are made to enforce these
contracts against the new Iraqi government (after the withdrawal of
power by the U.S.), then any and all private litigants face the problem of
encountering the FSIA and the act of state doctrine in the courts of the
United States.
IV. United States' Foreign Policy Regarding Contracts in Iraq and
Possible Violations of International Law
Having concluded that the United States as a military occupying
force was legally the party-in-interest to all pre-existing contracts of the
former Hussein regime, it next becomes necessary to examine just what
role the United States may have over all future contracts to be entered
into while military occupation and presence is taking place.
A.

The United States' Experience in Economic Rebuilding

The first inquiry that needs to be made is what the United States'
view of international law is regarding economic opportunities such as
these within an occupied territory. In 1907, in the case of Ho Tung &
Co. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Claims had to decide on the
appropriate tariff rate that should have been imposed during the U.S.
military occupation of Manila.53 In deciding that case, the court noted
that as a matter of law, there was no distinction between the temporary
occupation of Manila and the "usual occupation of belligerent
territory. 54 Thus, during the U.S. presence in Manila, the U.S. military
52. David Ignatius, After the Handover, WASH. POST, Jun. 29, 2004 at A23.
53. Ho Tung & Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 213 (1907).
The claimants in this case were shipping merchandise to American-held
Manila, following the Spanish-American War. Prior to the claimant's arrival to
Manila, President William McKinley signed a military order proclaiming a new
military tariff that was lower in value than the pre-existing Spanish tariff in
Manila. McKinley's order had not reached Manila at the time of the claimant's
arrival, however, and the claimants paid to the military port authorities the
amount of the old Spanish tariff. Upon learning of the date of the President's
order, the claimants sued in order to recover the difference between the Spanish
tariff they paid and the lower American tariff they argued that they would have
paid, had the information only arrived to Manila sooner. The Court ruled
against the claimants, stating that the President's order was could not modify
any existing municipal regulation in an occupied territory until actually
received and promulgated by the military government of such territory.
Id.
54.

Id.
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was exercising its rights as an occupying force, which included "the right
to take possession of the machinery for the collection of revenues within
the occupied district, and to make such collections. 5 5 A similar
distinction could easily be drawn to the present situation of the United
States in Iraq. While the present military occupation is undoubtedly a
temporary measure, 56 it would seem that the U.S. retains all rights
afforded an occupying force to take control of the economic
infrastructure in Iraqi territory and reap the benefits of such control.
The last time that the United States was engaged in a post-war
occupation of similar magnitude was directly after World War II.
Following the Allied victories in both Germany and Japan, the United
States entered into agreements that resulted, among other things, in
economic gains. After the fall of Hitler's Reich, the United States
entered into a multilateral treaty that established Germany's reparation
scale payments to the conquering Allied Nations. 7 Specifically, the
treaty stated that the United States was entitled to twenty-eight percent of
the total German reparation amount, excluding merchant ships, inland
water transport, and industrial or capital equipment removed from
Germany, of which the United States was entitled to only 11.8%.58
Upon the surrender of Japan, another multilateral treaty was entered
into, in which the United States was granted full administration,
legislation, and jurisdiction over former Japanese territories. 59
55.
56.

Id.
Slevin, supra note 6.

57. Agreement Between The United States of America and Other Governments
Respecting the Distributionof German Reparation, the Establishment of an Inter-Allied

Reparation Agency, and the Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 24, 1946, art. 1, 61 Stat.
3157.
58. Id. The treaty provides, in relevant part, as follows:
ARTICLE 1: Shares in Reparations.
A. German reparation (exclusive of the funds to be Allocated under
Article 8, of Part I of this Agreement), shall be divided into the following
Categories:
Category A, which shall include all forms of German reparation
except those included in Category B;
Category B, which shall include industrial and Other capital
equipment removed from Germany,
And merchant ships and inland water transport.
B. Each Signatory Government shall be entitled to the Percentage share of
the total value of Category A and the percentage share of the total value of
Category B set out for that Government in the Table of Shares set forth
below:
TABLE OF SHARES: (in pertinent part)
Category B
Category A
Country
11.80 %
28.00 %
United States
of America
Id.
59. Treaty of Peace With Japan, Sept. 8,1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 3, 3U.S.T.3169.
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Furthermore, the U.S. obtained full recognition by Japan of the validity
of private and state property dispositions previously made by the U.S.
military.60 The United States also received the right to "seize, retain,
liquidate, or otherwise dispose," of any property then belonging to Japan
or its citizens.6 '
Clearly then, in the last two instances where the United States found
itself in the position as occupying military force in a foreign territory
following the cessation of hostilities, it approached post-war
organizational structures in a way that resulted in significant economic
gains for the United States, at the expense of the occupied country.
Is the United States' apparent preference towards economic gain to
occupying forces consistent with accepted international law? The Code
of International Armed Conflict (hereinafter The Code) states that during
a military occupation of a territory,62 the occupying power is prohibited
Article 3 reads:
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to
place under its trustee system, with the United States as the sole administering
authority, Nansei Shoto south of 290 north latitude (including the Ryuku Islands
and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin
Islands, Rosario Island and the volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus
Island. pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon,
the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of
these islands, including their territorial waters.
Id.
60. Id. at art. 4(b). Article 4(b) reads: "(b) Japan recognizes the validity of
dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to
directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in
Articles 2 and 3." Id.
61. Id. at art. 14(a)(1)(2)(I). Article 14(a)(1)(2)(I) reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(2)(1): Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (II) below, each of the Allied
Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all
property, rights and interests of:
(a) Japan and Japanese Nationals,
(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese Nationals, and
(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals, which on
the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its
jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or
under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which
belonged to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or
entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came
under the controls of such authorities.
Id.
62. LEVIE HowARD S., THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, VOL. II 713
(Oceana Publ'ns, Inc. 1986). Specially, § I 111.2 of The Code ("Military Occupation.
Requirements.") states:
(1) Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army.
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from destroying the public or private property within the territory. 63
However, the occupying power shall be regarded as an administrator or
usufruct, 64 and may thus enjoy the benefits of such public or private
property, so long as that property is not destroyed.6 5 Furthermore, the
occupying power may even take possession of all liquid assets of the
conquered state that may be used for military purposes, 66 may levy taxes
to support the occupation administration, 67 and may demand requisitions
to support the armed forces. 68 Thus, the Code seems to reflect, at least
on its face, the view held by the United States that a military occupation
force might properly profit from the resources found within enemy
territory.
B.

The United States' Decision to Ban Countriesfrom Iraqi Contracts
and Violations of InternationalLaw

One of the specific and important targets of U.S. rebuilding is Iraq's
natural resource production, most notably, its oil infrastructure.6 9
Traditionally, oil production and distribution has made up approximately
ninety-five percent of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings, 70 resulting from
the 2.452 million barrels per day output that Iraqi oil fields can average
when operating normally.7 1
Unfortunately, the entire Iraqi oil
infrastructure has been disabled as a result of the war, with most of the
northern pipeline operations completely destroyed.72 Experts have
estimated that it will take investments totaling between three to five
million dollars to restore the Iraqi oil production to pre-Gulf War
levels.73
Another specific target of U.S. military efforts is the Baghdad

(2) The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established, and can be exercised.
63. LEVIE, supra note 62 at 766.
64. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "usufruct" as "the legal right to use
and enjoy the benefits and profits of something belonging to another." See THE
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 804 (5 th ed. 1997).
65. LEVIE, supra note 62 at 766-7 (§ 1171.2).
66. Id. at 767 (§ 1171.3).
67. Id. at 740 (§ 1141.2).
68. Id. at739(§ 1141.1).
69. Borzou Daragahi, Iraqis Begin Talks With U.S. Army to Select Oil Minister;
Outlook Dim For Quick Recovery Of Northern Wells, Production Levels, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2003, at A16.
70. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Iraq) (2003) at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html.
71. Id. This figure represents a 2001 estimate, as the normal oil production was
disrupted as a result of the war. Id.
72. Daragahi, supra note 69.
73. Id.
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International Airport,74 as U.S. troops work to ensure the safety of planes
against future attacks.75 Even as the U.S. troops work to secure Baghdad
International, private airline companies are jockeying with the U.S.
Transportation Department to be allowed flight plans to and from
Baghdad.7 6 Moreover, the terminal has had another recent addition,
much to the approval of U.S. troops on the ground-a Burger King.77 In
the five months since its opening, this Burger King has made daily sales
between fifteen and eighteen thousand dollars, making it one of the top
ten most profitable Burger King franchises on Earth.78
Indeed, the U.S. military is beginning to unilaterally offer and
award contracts to private American domestic corporations to handle
various tasks and services on the Iraqi oil pipelines. 79 These contracts
have a stipulated value of not less than $500,000 and not more than $500
million U.S.C. They are being offered for a full range of tasks, including
the extinguishing of oil fires, oilfield and 80refinery maintenance, and
distribution of fuel products within Iraq itself.
The present policy of the United States regarding contract
opportunities in Iraq is quite unique. The U.S. announced in December,
2003, that it would be exercising ultimate control over the distribution of
all future Iraqi contracts, and that it would not allow countries (and their
companies) that did not actively assist in the war in Iraq to bid for any
primary contracts.81 The U.S. has shown its willingness to exercise
absolute discretion regarding any contracts by recently removing Canada
from the list of bidding-barred nations, allowing our neighbors to the

74. Baghdad International Airport was the new name given to Saddam Hussein
International Airport after occupation by U.S. armed forces. See Gary Dimmock and
Norma Greenaway, Coalition tightens grip on Baghdad: Three Journalists Killed in
Allied Shell Strikes on Hotel, Al Jazeera Headquarters. No Word on Whether Massive
Bomb Attack Struck Saddam, Sons, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 9, 2003, at A3.
75. See Raymond Bonner, The Struggle For Iraq; Missing Weapons; U.S. Can't
LocateMissiles Once Held in Arsenal of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at Al.
76. Edward Wong, Airlines Coveting Baghdad, If Airport Can Be Made Safe, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Al. The U.S. Transportation Department is currently reviewing
over a dozen applications from American airline companies seeking permission to fly
into and out of Baghdad international. The Transportation Department has stated that
American Airlines, United Airlines and Delta Airlines were all granted these flying rights
prior to 1990. Id.
77. Theola Labbe, Business Booms for Iraq's First Burger King, WASH. POST, Oct.
19, 2003, at A3.
78. Id.
79. United States Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Modifies
Contract Synopsis For Possible Future Work on Iraqi Oil Infrastructure, at
http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/oilsynopsismod.htm (Jun. 27, 2003).
80. Id.
81. Jackie Spinner, U.S. Bars Non-Allies From Bidding on Contracts in Iraq, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at A03.
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north to compete as primary contractors during the next bidding round.8 2
As of January, 2004, Russia, France, Germany, and Mexico
were among
83
bidding.
primary
any
from
barred
still
nations
major
the
Not surprisingly, this decision by the U.S. has resulted in pointed
criticisms overseas, especially from France, Germany, and the European
Union.84 In fact, the European Union (hereinafter "the EU") has stated
that it has serious doubts regarding the very legality of the U.S. decision
when placed against the backdrop of international economic law.
Specifically, the EU has challenged the U.S.'s control over Iraqi
contracts by pointing to the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Government Procurement.8 6
In 1994, during the Marrakesh Round of international trade talks,
the Government Procurement Agreement was drafted and annexed to the
original World Trade Organization agreement.8 7 The Agreement on
Government Procurement (hereinafterthe AGP) was created in order to
promote transparency and equality in the arena of international
government procurement of contracts, and was designed to eliminate
protectionist foreign trade policies by Member states while liberalizing
and expanding the sphere of world trade.88
The actual reach of the AGP is broad, as it covers any regulation or
procedure relating to contractual procurement of any goods or services
by a Member state,89 including the valuation of such contracts. 90 The
82. Mike Allen and Kevin Sullivan, Iraq Contracts Opened to Canadians;Reversal
by Bush Continues Effort at Summit of Americas to Defuse Criticism, WASH. POST, Jan.
14, 2004, at A15.
83. Id.
84. Germany's Schroeder, UN Chief Hit Out at US Iraq Contracts Move, AFP, Dec.
11, 2003, available at http://uk.news.yahoo.com/031211/323/egunm.html.
85. EU-US: Commission Urges U.S. to Reconsider Iraq Reconstruction Contracts
Decision, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/
iraq/intro/ip03- 713.htm.
86. Id.
87. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 (1996)
[hereinafter AGP].
88. Id.
89. Id. at art. I, para. 2 at 122. Article I, paragraph 2 reads: (2) This agreement
applies to procurement by any contractual means, including through such methods as
purchase or lease, rental or hire purchase, with or without an option to buy, including any
combination of products and services. Id.
90. Id. at art. II at 122. Article II reads, in pertinent part:
(1) The following provisions shall apply in determining the value of contracts
for purposes of implementing this Agreement.
(2) Valuation shall take into account all forms of remuneration, including any
premiums, fees commissions and interest available.
(3) The selection of valuation method used by the entity shall not be used, nor
shall any procurement requirement be divided, with the intention of avoiding
the application of this agreement.
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AGP also sets out the guidelines by which procurement tender offers and
selections must be handled by a Member state. 9' It is in this area that the
U.S. policies in Iraq may indeed run afoul of international law.
Article III of the AGP ensures that each Member state may not offer
procurement treatment to any other Member state that is less favorable
than the treatment afforded to the domestic suppliers or producers of the
offering state.92 Article VII, a related section, stipulates that each
Member state must ensure that all contract tender offers that are made to
93
other Member states are done so in a non-discriminatory manner.
Finally, in order to "ensure maximum international competition," Article
X mandates that each Member state offering procurement must invite the
maximum number of both domestic and international suppliers to tender
offers.94
Clearly, the U.S.'s policy regarding contract opportunities in
occupied Iraq violates not only the spirit of the AGP, but of all three of
the specific articles listed above. By acting as the ultimate judge-andjury over which countries may or may not be allowed to participate in the
reconstruction of Iraq, the U.S. is overtly discriminating against some
nations in favor of others. Moreover, the United States is intentionally
stifling international competition in the Middle East, simply to sanction
those nations that refused to assist in the Iraqi invasion.9 5 It would seem
that this foreign policy initiative was constructed with either a blind or
contemptuous eye towards the AGP.
Id.
91. Id. atart. III, IV, Xat 123-24, 131-32.
92. Id. at art. III, para. 1 at 123. Article III, paragraph 1 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide
immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of
other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less
favorable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers.
Id.
93. Id. at art. VII, para. 1 at 127. Article VII, paragraph 1 reads:
(1) Each Party shall ensure that the tendering procedures of its entities are
applied in a non-discriminatory manner and are consistent with the
provisions contained in Articles VII through XVI.
Id.
94. Id. at art. X, para. 1 at 131. Article X, paragraph 1 reads:
(1) To ensure optimum effective international competition under selective
tendering procedures, entities shall, for each intended procurement, invite
tenders from the maximum number of domestic suppliers and suppliers from
other Parties, consistent with the efficient operation of the procurement system.
They shall select the suppliers to participate in the procedure in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.
Id.
95.

Allen, supra note 82.
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As base a violation of the AGP as the U.S.'s decision appears at
first glance, it may still be readily defensible on the world stage. Indeed,
the United States can point to Article XXIII of the very same accord,
which declares that the AGP shall not be construed as prohibiting any
Member state from taking any action that it deems necessary for reasons
of national security or defense.96 When this pronouncement was first
made, back in December of 2003, United States Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz stated that "for the protection and essential
security interests of the United States," it was essential that the contractbarring decision be put into effect. 97
The question now becomes: what level of justification is needed in
order for a Member state to legally invoke Article XXIII? If any
Member state calls a press conference and officially recites the magic
words of "national security," is the specter of the AGP instantaneously
dissolved into the ether of state sovereignty? As the United Nations is
premised upon the fundamental tenet of sovereign equality, this simple
action just may be enough.98 However, if this were all a Member state
needed to do in order to escape any unfavorable situation, then the entire
corpus of the AGP would be but mere surplusage.
The AGP itself affords no answers. In reality, any claim by the U.S.
of national security interests will hold greater weight than usual at this
point in time, as the situation in Iraq remains unstable at best. However,
the mere claim of "national security" is probably not going to be seen by
the rest of the world (especially by those countries cut-out of a piece of
the Iraqi pie) as a clean-cut absolution of U.S. obligations under the
AGP. Although it has been made, and may ultimately prevail, the
shepard's cry of "national security" will more than likely be a wolf that
devours a fair share of the United States' international political capital.
Assuming that the U.S. can successfully win the debate over any
violations of the AGP, a political battle must still be fought on yet
another front. Namely, is the U.S. Iraqi contract-barring policy in
violation of the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States?
The General Assembly of the United Nations passed the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States (hereinafter the CERDS) in 1974
in order to establish uniformity and to establish "a new system of
96. AGP at art. XXIII, para. 1 at 144. Article XXIII, paragraph 1 reads, in pertinent
part:
(1) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from
taking any action ...which it considers necessary for.. . procurement
indispensable for national security or for national defense purposes. Id.
97. Spinner, supra note 81.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
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international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality and
interdependence of interests of developed and developing countries." 99
The drafters of the CERDS were hopeful that the Charter would promote
expansion of international trade and international economic
cooperation.' 00 Unfortunately, many of the objectives of the CERDS
have now been disrupted by the U.S.'s Iraqi-contract decision.
International economic discrimination is addressed and condemned
under Article 4 of the CERDS, as it explicitly forbids any State from
engaging in inequitable international trade based upon another State's
"political, economic or social systems."''
Article 4 reminds States that
the purpose of international trade is cooperation, and that each State is
free to engage in international trade as it sees fit.'0 2 This ideal is further
expanded upon in Articles 24 and 26, where the CERDS proclaims that
all States have upon them a duty to conduct their affairs in the
international economic market with the interests of all other 0 States
in
4
mind,' O3 as well as in the interests of tolerance and cooperation.
Finally, Articles 8, 9, and 10 are noteworthy because they remind
the world that all States are "juridically equal,"'0 5 and thus all States have

99. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (xxix), U.N.
GAOR, 29 th Sess., Supp. No.31, at 50 (1974) [hereinafter CERDS].
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 4. Article 4 reads, in pertinent part:
Every State has the right to engage in international trade and other forms of
economic co-operation irrespective of any differences in political, economic
and social systems. No State shall be subjected to discrimination of any kind
based solely on such differences.
Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at art. 24. Article 24 reads:
All States have the duty to conduct their mutual economic relations in a manner
which [sic] takes into account the interest of other countries. In particular, all
States should avoid prejudicing the interests of developing countries.
Id.
104. Id. art. 26. Article 26 reads:
All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance and live together in peace,
irrespective of differences in political, economic, social and cultural systems,
and to facilitate trade between States having different economic and social
systems. International trade should be conducted without prejudice to
generalized non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences in favour [sic]
of developing countries, on the basis of mutual advantage, equitable benefits
and the exchange of most-favoured-nation [sic] treatment.
Id.
105. Id. at art. 10. Article 10 reads, in pertinent part:
All States are juridically equal and, as equal members of the international
community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the
international decision-making process in the solution of world economic,
financial and monetary problems.
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the right to participate in any decision-making that implicates the world's
economic relations or problems. These last three articles, taken together,
has
truly stand for the belief that hegemony or unilateral decision-making
06
forum.'
economic
international
modern
the
in
no place
As it was with the above analysis of the contract-barring decision
under the Agreement on Government Procurement, it is not terribly
difficult to see how the policy laid down by the U.S. regarding all future
Iraqi contracts serves only to frustrate (some would even say "shatter")
the clear goals of the CERDS. The U.S. is carrying out this autonomous
decision-making in the face of an international charter that flatly
denounces any such behavior in the economic realm. As the impetus for
this policy choice was to punish those countries that decided not to
intervene in the Iraq crisis (a political decision), there arguably also a
clear violation of CERDS Article 4107
While the United States is able to employ the somewhat-plausible
justification of "the interests of national security" if ever attacked under
the Agreement on Government Procurement, it will have a harder time
doing so under the CERDS. Textually, the CERDS contains no article
that uses the word "exception," or the phrase "shall not apply.' 0 8 The
language and construction of CERDS is such that purports to exist in all
circumstances and at all times. The United States will have a hard, if not
impossible task, of defending the Iraqi-contract decision in the light of
the ideals and tenets held sacred under this Charter. Under CERDS,
there is no "national security" umbrella for the U.S. to open in the
rainstorm of international economic parity.
V.

Conclusion

As current military occupier and quasi-administrator, the United
States must acknowledge both the lessons of the past as well as the
obstacles in the future when deciding upon policies regarding all preexisting and future economic contracts in Iraq. History has proven time
106. Id. at art. 8, 9, 10. See text of Article 10 above. Articles 8 and 9 read as follows:
(8) States should co-operate in facilitating more rational and equitable
international economic relations and in encouraging structural changes in the
context of a balanced world economy in harmony with the needs and interests
of all countries, especially developing countries, and should take appropriate
measures to this end.
(9) All States have the responsibility to co-operate in the economic, social,
cultural, scientific and technological fields for the promotion of economic and
social progress throughout the world, especially that of the developing
countries.
Id.
107. Compare Spinner, supra note 81, with id., supra note 101.
108. CERDS, supra note 99.
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and again that regime changes that alter the basest political or ideological
nature of a sovereign nation do not result in the dissolution of that
nation's international contract obligations.
While politically or
territorially a State may be completely erased and redrawn, bearing no
semblance to its former self, all of its contract rights and duties remain in
force.
The United States must recognize this, for while acting as military
occupier of Iraq, it also became the successor-in-interest to all contracts
made by the former Hussein regime. This transfer of interest carries with
it contractual obligations that the U.S. must abide by, as well as all
potential liabilities that may be suffered.
The pre-existing contracts are not the only concern that the U.S. has,
as it must also be careful how it handles all future contracts made during
U.S. occupation as well. The current policy of the U.S., in barring all
countries that did not lend support for the War in Iraq from bidding upon
new contracts seems to violate many of the fundamental precepts of
international economic law. These policies, if they continue in their
current form, could very well carry with them a price tag of their own for
the United States, namely in the form of political capital, international
reputation, and perhaps serious reprisals upon the world stage.
One estimate by the Office of Management and Budget places the
total amount of money to be spent by the United States on Iraqi
reconstruction to be approximately $18.4 billion dollars.' 0 9 While this
estimate does take into account future contracting activity by the U.S., it
does not appear to consider any of the consequences that could very well
result from a mishandling of pre-existing and future contracts.1 10 It
seems that litigation, remedy and international sanction costs have not
been factored into this equation, although all three could become an
immediate reality and quickly spiral out of control if the history books
and treaties remain dusty on the shelves. It would seem as if the days of
Caesar, Napoleon and Fredrick the Great have vanished; in the modem
world, war is no longer a profitable hobby.

109. Office of Management and Budget, Jan., 2004, Quarterly Reports on Iraq, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ legislative/20040105-sec2207_fundingtable.pdf. The
Office of Management and Budget is required to send quarterly reports to Congress
regarding the reconstruction in Iraq pursuant to Section 2207 of the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, FY 2004. See, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense
and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat.
1209 (2003).
110. Id.

